Skip to content
Unmanned Systems / Aerial Drones

FPV drones: Russian manual attributes up to 70 per cent of losses to Ukrainian drones

How dangerous are FPV drones for Russia’s troops? A new manual of the Russian armed forces gives a drastic estimate, weighs up the weapon’s strengths and weaknesses and lists countermeasures for units and individual soldiers.

Soldat bringt Drohne zum Einsatz
© Archiv

A new manual issued by the Russian armed forces on FPV drones contains dramatic figures – FPV stands for first-person view, i.e. the view from the pilot’s own perspective. Its title: “Tactics of the enemy’s use of FPV drones and options for countering them”.

The document was prompted by the fact that these drones have gained considerably in importance as an effective weapon in recent months of the war. According to the estimates it cites, up to 70 per cent of Russian losses in personnel and equipment on all fronts are caused by Ukrainian kamikaze drones.

Strengths and weaknesses of the weapon

According to the manual, the drones’ advantages are simple control, rapid response, high manoeuvrability and a speed of up to 120 km/h. They are robust against electronic warfare because configurations and settings can be changed quickly. The advantages are rounded off by their flexible design and relatively low cost.

The paper lists the following disadvantages: limited flight time, a rather short range without repeaters and a lack of qualified personnel – anyone who wants to use the drones effectively needs high-quality training.

How FPV drones can be countered

The paper devotes considerable space to the options for defending against the drones. The following graphics are taken from the document and give a brief overview of the various modes of employment:

Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
The most common method: use of a reconnaissance drone followed by an attack on the reconnoitred target by an FPV drone. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
“Free hunt”: independent attack by FPV drones on previously identified targets and positions. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
FPV group attack. Variant of #1, but with several FPV drones used simultaneously against several targets. This requires a correspondingly large number of free channels for radio transmission. It is only possible if electronic warfare fails when employing broad-spectrum electronic attack assets. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
Assault support: classic close air support for an attack team advancing on the ground. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
Ambush: an FPV drone can land in a concealed position and wait there for a target in standby mode for several hours. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
Combined strike: attack on a vehicle as in #1. After the crew dismounts from the disabled vehicle, attack by a large multicopter bomber drone of the Baba Yaga type. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
Double strike: the protection of a fortified position is breached by FPV drones with shaped charges. This is followed by FPV drones with thermobaric and/or fragmentation charges against the personnel inside. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
Booby trap: the FPV drone is placed as a potential “war trophy” and explodes when picked up, by remote detonation or a motion-sensitive fuze. One variant involves smaller explosive charges of 20 to 50 grams hidden in the drone’s structure, which detonate when the drone is taken apart. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
Mine-laying: placing anti-personnel and anti-tank mines as well as camouflaged IEDs on approach routes in depth. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
Mine clearance: dropping munitions or placing an explosive charge on mines and clearing them by detonation. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
FPV bomber: FPV drones drop munitions on identified targets. As a variant, the FPV drone can deliver small quantities of supplies to friendly positions that are difficult to reach. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
FPV dragon: spraying incendiary thermite mixtures over enemy positions from a height of up to 50 metres. Temperature above 2,300 degrees, burn time up to two minutes. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
FPV interceptor: interception of fixed-wing reconnaissance drones by FPV drones. The reconnaissance drone is destroyed by detonating a fragmentation charge or by ramming. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
FPV sabotage: covert emplacement of FPV drones by infiltration teams. Remote activation by a signal via the mobile phone network, autonomous attack on pre-programmed coordinates. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
FPV mothership: use of a carrier drone that carries two or three FPV drones as payload over 60 to 70 kilometres and also acts as a repeater. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
FPV fibre-optic drone: control of the FPV drone via fibre-optic cable. Missions over distances of 10 to a maximum of 25 kilometres have been documented. The advantages are a much better video image and immunity to electronic warfare measures. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
Building inspection: use of an FPV mini-copter with propeller guards for reconnaissance inside buildings. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
FPV psyops: FPV drone with a loudspeaker to deliver audio messages with an information-psychological effect. · © Archiv
Russisches Handbuch zur Taktik und dem Einsatz von FPV-Drohnen
FPV propaganda: FPV drone for dropping leaflets with an information-psychological effect. · © Archiv

According to the document, active and passive measures are to be implemented both by the unit as a whole and by each individual soldier. These include: locating and eliminating drone pilots, detecting unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) early and warning units, using electronic countermeasures, moving quickly in exposed zones, evading, firing in a targeted manner and defending mechanically, for example with nets. Reinforced positions, camouflage, decoy positions, protective netting and smoke generators are also indispensable.

The paper concludes that technical development has considerably broadened the range of possible combat missions with FPV drones. In combat units, demand for trained pilots and for drones exceeds supply. New types of units are expected – for employment as well as for defence. The race between drones and counter-drones, the paper concludes, has only just begun.

Photo credits

© Archiv
Advertisement336 × 280
Perimeter Protection 2027 – Secure ticket now! 19–21 January 2027, Nuremberg (incontent)

Continue exploring

The week in unmanned systems.