EU drone wall: sensors, countermeasures and costs per 100 kilometres of border

It became known as the EU drone wall and is now called the European Drone Defence Initiative (EDDI): the drone wall is defined as a multi-layered network intended to detect, track and neutralise hostile drones. At the same time, advanced drone platforms are to provide precision strike capabilities. The launch is still planned for the first quarter of this year; initial operational capability is to be reached by the end of the year, full functionality by the end of 2027.

The initiative was initially intended for the states along the EU's eastern border, which is around 4,000 kilometres long. Meanwhile, however, other EU countries are also showing interest.

A paper from a state on the EU's eastern border now sets out in detail which elements make up the drone wall planned there, how many of them are needed and what they cost. Its figures refer to a sector 100 kilometres long and 15 kilometres deep – the area of responsibility of a brigade. A brigade comprises around 5,000 soldiers, organised into several battalions as well as companies with special functions reporting directly to the command.

What the drone wall consists of

Several key elements are to form the structure: a sensor network as well as combat drones in the air as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), on land as unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and, on the EU's maritime borders, also on the water as unmanned surface vessels (USVs). In addition, there is a multi-tier system of countermeasures and a C4ISR command and information system.

The drone elements are shaped above all by Ukraine's experience, both in organisation and in materiel requirements (-> Baba Yaga – Ukraine's feared attack drone). Close coordination with air defence is also necessary.

Sensor network with artificial intelligence

The foundation of the architecture is a network of sensors of all kinds working on the principle of “see everything, always”. At every point of the border, it is to report as early, precisely and seamlessly as possible whether the enemy is present, how he is moving and what he is doing. To achieve the necessary reaction speed, artificial intelligence continuously evaluates the countless sensor data – it plays a central role.

Acoustics

Acoustic sensors passively pick up low-frequency air vibrations, such as engine noise, the sound of wheels and tracks, drone rotors or gunshots. Artificial intelligence classifies objects by their acoustic signature and thus distinguishes, for example, whether animals and people or vehicles and small drones are moving. These sensors are particularly important at night, in poor visibility or in dense vegetation, because the range of optical sensors is then limited. The paper provides for 600 devices per 100 kilometres.

Seismics

Ground vibrations such as those caused by infantry and wheeled and tracked vehicles are registered by seismic sensors. Their strength lies in detecting well-camouflaged objects moving silently. 400 of these devices are planned per 100 kilometres.

From the strength, direction and speed of the movement, evaluated by AI, it is possible to predict precisely when and where a threat is approaching. Seismic networks can be laid underground and work regardless of visibility or whether signals are jammed.

EO and IR modules

The high-resolution images of electro-optics allow the shape, direction of movement and surroundings of objects to be tracked precisely. Thermal imaging (IR) modules, by contrast, capture heat signatures, so that targets stand out regardless of lighting or camouflage. Electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) sensors usually run in sync, allowing uninterrupted surveillance at any time of day and in any weather.

Artificial intelligence algorithms enable these sensors to identify and classify objects automatically by contour, movement dynamics or thermal profile. Teledyne, Sierra-Olympia, AXIS, FLIR Systems and Optex are listed as manufacturers. Per 100 kilometres, 100 EO cameras, 200 IR cameras and 50 infrared light barriers are mentioned.

Passive analysis of the radio spectrum

For signals intelligence, passive radio frequency (RF) spectrum analysers are used – advanced devices that, unlike active radars, emit no pulses themselves. Instead, they evaluate what is being transmitted anyway: radios, drone control channels, relay stations, GPS spoofing, 4G/5G pulses and even Wi-Fi networks.

Because they analyse the RF spectrum on multiple channels in real time, they allow precise triangulation: enemy signal sources can be located to within five to 20 metres. The paper names the companies CRFS, Aaronia and Hensoldt as specialists.

The next element of the wall builds on the 60 passive RF spectrum analysers planned per 100 kilometres.

Electromagnetic attack

Electromagnetic attack (EA) is the most important means against the enemy's cheap drone systems used in large numbers. Such devices can suppress control and transmission channels, as well as global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals. With electromagnetic pulses, EA systems are also able to damage or destroy the on-board electronics of entire drone swarms. They can also deceive guided munitions with electromagnetic sensors by simulating false targets.

Skylock 5G, Kvertzs Skysec and Dedrone Defender are listed as devices. At full operational capability, around 60 devices per 100 kilometres are planned in this area as well.

Radar as active sensor

Defence cannot be coordinated without active radar systems: only this type of sensor detects unmanned aerial objects that emit no communication signals, such as autonomous drones or fibre-optic-controlled devices. Radar is the most important element for precisely determining target coordinates.

Radars listed include the Saab Giraffe 1X, Hensoldt TRML-4D, APS SkyCtrl or Echodyne Echoshield. They detect a wide range of objects – small drones, cluster munitions, aircraft, helicopters and even flocks of birds – and automatically separate threats from harmless targets based on their signature. 20 devices per 100 kilometres are mentioned.

Common operational picture

All sensors should be deployed in multiple layers, staggered and densely, so that every area is covered by several sensors – tailored to threat intensity, terrain and infrastructure. The sensor network should be connected to a common situational awareness platform (DELTA, Palantir, Sitaware) that processes and classifies the data and passes it on to the troops in real time.

Around 19 million euros per 100 kilometres are estimated for this sensor network, including the necessary communications infrastructure and power supply. In operations, 20 to 40 per cent of the devices are expected to fail every 30 days. In addition to the drone control technology, the equipment of the drone teams mentioned includes UHF/HF radios, Starlink terminals and power generators.

Multi-layered air defence

The already known multi-layered air defence systems – very short-range and close-in air defence as well as short-, medium- and long-range air defence – must be fully connected to the wall's C4ISR infrastructure. What is required is a largely automated decision chain ranging from detecting and classifying targets to selecting and implementing measures. Artificial intelligence is decisive here, enabling real-time responses even to very dense drone attacks.

A “Blue Drone ID” system is also needed: every air defence component is to use it to recognise friendly drones automatically so that no own drones are engaged.

Effectors for hard kill

Over populated areas, interceptor drones (-> Interceptor drones: a new class of air defence) take out targets, such as the Tytan Interceptor or other autonomous models based on artificial intelligence. They are used within an integrated architecture.

This includes a mobile 3D radar with a range of 10 to 15 kilometres, an EO/IR image analysis system and an AI-based decision module. Even under GPS jamming or at night, the interceptor drones detect, track and destroy their targets autonomously. Ideally, an interceptor drone costs less than 5,000 euros. The systems are to be available across the board.

With more speed and range as well as better sensors, jet-powered counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems such as the Raytheon Coyote Block 2 can act at greater distances against focal threats such as drone swarms.

Systems such as Oerlikon-Rheinmetall Skyranger and Skynex protect critical infrastructure, airports or military units against high-intensity drone attacks.

For tactical use, low-cost infantry systems are suitable, such as portable grenade launchers with programmable munitions or nets, but also improvised solutions of lower intensity. Using lasers and microwaves, directed energy weapons can damage or destroy drones thermally or electromagnetically; one example is Epirus Leonidas.

Autonomous interceptor drones with artificial intelligence are regarded as the future of defence systems against unmanned aerial vehicles. They are meant to be able to adapt to high-density drone attacks.

Conclusion

As a multi-tier, advanced defence system, the drone wall relies on decentralised, automated and rapidly reacting structures. These are based on sensor networks, unmanned aerial vehicles, artificial intelligence and autonomy at tactical level. A broad range of technologies is brought together, above all multispectral sensors and diverse unmanned systems of widely varying range and effect.

Behind this is the logic of network-centric warfare, which emphasises speed, situational awareness and the ability to act faster than the enemy. It is stressed that the drone wall is not a hypothetical concept but a practically feasible model whose building blocks are already in use on the front in Ukraine and in Israeli defence structures.