Shahed drone with Ukrainian SIM card: why Russia builds 4G modems into the Geran-2

Commercial 4G modems and Ukrainian SIM cards are often found in the Russian Shahed drone (Geran 2) – recent examinations of downed examples prove this. For the drone operator this is practical: data can be transmitted during flight with little effort, and navigation also becomes easier. The price is greater vulnerability to interference.

It is nothing new that the wreckage of enemy weapon systems, missiles and drones – whether they impacted, were shot down or crashed – is often examined closely. Such analyses reveal a great deal about the opponent's technological capabilities, its production methods, the origin of individual components or how the systems fundamentally work.

This may lead to more effective methods of defence and protection. The information gathered may also help to target or disrupt enemy production or supply chains more precisely.

The drone war in particular is proving a real treasure trove – not least because many drones contain civilian technology.

What the modem in the Shahed drone reveals

Last November, a 4G modem with a Ukrainian SIM card was discovered for the first time in a crashed Russian Geran-2 (Shahed-136) drone. An example with a Wi-Fi camera taped onto it has also been seen.

Such equipment immediately suggests one conclusion: during flight, the Shahed drone sends data to the shooter. This could be its current position, but also flight parameters and/or technical data of the drone. The devices are in the air for hours and over hundreds of kilometres – for the attacker it is of course valuable to know exactly where the drone is and, if it crashes or is shot down, where, why and by what.

In further attacks, the attacker could then choose a different route or flight altitude and fly around or over identified air defence positions.

It is of course equally conceivable that these findings are evaluated immediately to give other drones a new course while still in flight.

Less well known are LBS functions (location-based services). They are commonly associated with satellite navigation, but they are in fact purely network functions. Using the cell ID of the mobile phone masts and measuring the signal propagation time between different masts, a position can be determined to within around 100 to 150 metres. That is not enough for a reliable hit on a house or an air defence system – but it certainly is for an area target such as an industrial plant, a substation or a railway station.

Against this background, it may also be worth looking at the increasing number of stray flights by some Shahed drones. As easily as civilian systems can be misused, this misuse can just as easily be countered – provided the defender has first understood how they work. This may be precisely why more Shahed drones drifted north out of Ukraine this summer and flew into Belarus.