Air defence under pressure: can saturation attacks still be contained?

A simple calculation applies to air defence: every air defence system has a certain magazine depth, and once it is exhausted, it has to be reloaded. Take a medium-range air defence battery with six launchers, each carrying eight missiles. After 48 rounds at the latest, it is “game over” for the time being – reloading follows, and that takes time.

The same principle applies to entire armed forces: they, too, have only a limited number of air defence assets at their disposal. Interceptors cost several million euros each, which is why even well-funded armies do not stockpile them in unlimited quantities. Nor is industry able to deliver arbitrarily large numbers quickly.

THAAD: more production, rapid consumption

On 29 January, Lockheed Martin announced a framework agreement with the Pentagon intended to quadruple production of the THAAD interceptor. In future, 400 of the expensive missiles are to be produced per year instead of the previous 96.

This contrasts with a CNN report of 21 April: according to it, the US Armed Forces used up “at least half” of their THAAD missile stock in just seven weeks of war against Iran. At best, around 300 missiles are said to remain. In less than two months, what is produced in three years was fired.

Even after the announced quadrupling, one year’s production would only be enough for two months of combat – and only if all missiles stay in national stocks and the export customers Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates receive nothing.

Patriot missiles: demand far exceeds supply

Switzerland is currently facing exactly this problem. In 2022 it ordered five Patriot systems, but a delivery date is completely open: the USA, as supplier, cannot or will not give the Swiss government an answer. Supply is far below demand.

Ukraine has received a total of eight Patriot systems from Germany, the USA, the Netherlands and Romania. But even for these eight systems, missiles are running or have already run short. Evidently, Patriot missile production is not even sufficient to cover Ukraine’s needs alone. No change is expected any time soon.

In 2025, 620 Patriot missiles came off Lockheed Martin’s production line; in future the figure is to be 2,000. Apart from the USA, sixteen other countries operate or have ordered Patriot systems. In the USA, there are fears that it could take up to six years to replenish the stocks fired against Iran in just a few weeks.

Ukrainian air defence: guns and interceptor drones

Because air defence missiles of all classes – from MANPADS to the Patriot mentioned above – are expensive and scarce, Ukraine deploys mobile units with guns of various calibres. In addition, interceptor drones have been developed that can intercept targets at altitudes of up to around three kilometres and at speeds of up to around 200 km/h. Besides the well-known long-range kamikaze drones Shahed, Geran-2 and Gerbera, they also target reconnaissance and attack drones along the front line. According to Ukrainian figures, around 1,000 interceptor drones are produced every day, and an expansion to up to 2,000 per day is possible.

Russia’s latest strategy shows that it is at least trying to overwhelm the defence at this lower level as well. Expensive attack drones such as the Lancet loitering munition are being used less and less. By contrast, the number of cheap Molniya drones, built from aluminium and plywood, is rising sharply.

Mit Massenangriffen mit Molniya-Drohnen versucht Russland die ukrainischen Flugabwehrdrohnen-Einheiten zu überlasten.
Video der 34. Marineinfanteriebrigade und des Signum Bataillons der letzten Tage.#WarOfDrones pic.twitter.com/jllWqA0XrT— Martin Rosenkranz🇦🇹🇪🇺🇺🇳🇺🇦🇮🇱 (@MartinRosenkra3) April 25, 2026

Serhii Flash comments: “With an even greater stream of ‘Molniya’, the enemy is trying to overwhelm our air defence drone crews.” The Ukrainian Signum Battalion alone intercepted 50 Molniya drones over the past two days.

In the USA there is talk of the Golden Dome, in Europe of Sky Shield. Increasingly, the question arises whether the defenders of the airspace can ever gain the upper hand given the asymmetry of numbers and costs in air warfare. As things stand, it is doubtful that air defence can hold out in prolonged conflicts.