Drone warfare at a distance: Russia attacks with AI swarms and heavier warheads

How rapidly Russia's drone warfare is evolving, above all with long-range drones, was recently a topic at the Landeuro Symposium and Exposition in Wiesbaden. The event was hosted by the Association of the US Army (AUSA), where experts presented new findings.

Three times as many attacks, different altitudes

According to the information presented, Russia now launches three times as many long-range drones as it did six months ago. Tactics and technology have also been adapted: the drones used to fly low to stay below radar coverage. Today they climb above 3,000 metres, evading ground fire such as machine guns mounted on pickups. Only shortly before the target do they descend to 500 to 1,500 metres.

Decoys, cluster munitions, thermobaric warheads

About half of the drones are simple decoys without a warhead, intended to deceive air defence systems. The rest now carry up to 100 kilograms of TNT – previously 30 kilograms was typical. The heavier explosive load reduces range, but in practice launches from “only” 700 kilometres away are sufficient. In some cases cluster munitions or thermobaric warheads are also used.

Depending on the model, the drones cost between 15,000 and almost 200,000 euros. Some new Russian types have jet engines and fly at up to 450 km/h.

AI-driven swarm attacks

Artificial intelligence (AI) is considered the decisive game changer. The latest Shahed models use AI to coordinate their attacks: they gather ahead of the target area and then strike as a coordinated swarm to overwhelm Ukrainian air defence. While 95 per cent of the drones could still be shot down in March, today it is only 70 to 85 per cent.

What Ukraine deploys against them

According to AUSA, machine guns used for point defence achieve a success rate of only around 40 per cent. Guns of 23-millimetre calibre and above are more effective, such as the ZU-23 (up to 2,000 metres) or Gepard with 35-millimetre guns (up to 3,000 metres). Ukraine, however, has too few of these systems.

Fighter jets such as the F-16 or MiG-29 also hunt drones, but at high risk. Interceptor drones with proximity detonation shoot down 70 per cent of their targets; position lights serve them for identification friend or foe. Ukraine plans to build 1,000 such drones a day in future, at a unit price of just under 5,000 euros.

Up to 6 billion euros needed

For interceptor drones alone, Ukraine puts the funding needed to reach this goal at around 1.6 billion euros. President Volodymyr Zelensky is calling for just under 6 billion euros for the entire drone capacity, including long-range and tactical drones. Ukraine currently produces about 200 drones a day; up to 350 would be possible – the only limit is funding.

Jet-powered drones as a new threat

Russian jet-powered drones pose a new risk, as most recently on 31 July, when a group of eight was used. Existing interceptor drones are too slow for them; at present they can only be engaged with missiles costing 500,000 to 1 million euros each. How quickly Russia can ramp up production remains open owing to complexity and cost.

Drone warfare in reverse: Ukrainian long-range drones

Conversely, Ukraine also attacks Russia with long-range drones. According to current information, about 10 out of 50 launched drones hit their target. The damage usually remains limited because Russia can rely on many decentralised production sites.

Nevertheless, drone warfare has become a central element of the conflict – shaped by growing technologisation, automation and financial dependence. Future air superiority is increasingly being decided at the level of the drone.

Warning against Ukraine as a blueprint

Justin Bronk, air warfare analyst at the RUSI institute, explicitly warns against seeing Ukraine's drone war against Russia as a blueprint, in a recent video appearance with US vlogger “Mooch” (a former F-14 backseater) titled “Why Drones Don’t Win Wars”. Western politicians and senior military leaders should not base their own orientation or doctrine on it – without the Briton thereby diminishing Ukraine's achievements.

At its core, Bronk's argument is this: over more than three years, Russia has begun to defend itself effectively against the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) now deployed in their millions – at any rate far more efficiently than Europe's often sluggish peacetime bureaucracies. In addition, Moscow, with support from Iran among others, has brought its own long-range drone systems to operational maturity.

Everything on counter-drone defence

His conclusion: for a possible conflict with Putin's Russia, Europe and the US should not build on “drone armies” but on capable counter-drone defence. For organisational and structural reasons, Western armed forces cannot implement innovation cycles at company or battalion level as quickly as Ukraine is forced to do in a state of war.

Today Ukraine is the “global UAV market leader” – chasing this lead achieves little. As a guiding principle for Western armies, Bronk offers a clear verdict: “Everything into defence!”