Counter-drone defence: why electronic systems remain indispensable despite fibre-optic drones

Stephan Kraschansky, managing director of Aaronia Austria, regards the idea that electronic counter-drone defence is outdated as a common misconception – and disputes it. Unmanned systems are evolving rapidly and becoming a growing threat, both on the front lines in Ukraine and for security-critical infrastructure in Europe. Against this background, he sets out why electronic warfare (EW) is more important today than ever before.

At first glance, asking whether electronic countermeasures are still needed at all seems a fair question. Drones are encountered everywhere today, on the battlefield as well as in criminal operations. In Ukraine, unmanned systems have long shaped everyday combat – from cheap off-the-shelf multicopters to highly sophisticated models. They decide over life and death: they conduct precise reconnaissance, mark targets and drop explosive devices, and some are designed as flying bombs from the outset. Drones are also constant companions in the Middle East. Regular armed forces use them for reconnaissance, while terrorist groups use improvised systems to overwhelm air defences or deliberately attack soldiers and civilians.

But drones are not only a problem on the battlefield. Closer to home, too, they have long since arrived in the world of crime: smugglers use them to move drugs, mobile phones or weapons across borders and into prisons. Terrorists are testing drones to drop explosive devices over crowds or to attack critical infrastructure. With this reality in mind, questioning electronic counter-drone technology seems almost naive. Nevertheless, the argument keeps surfacing that electronic counter-drone defence has had its day because modern systems are increasingly guided by fibre-optic cable. That sounds plausible, but it falls short and overlooks the broader significance of electronic warfare.

“one keeps hearing the claim that electronic counter-drone defence is outdated because modern systems are increasingly controlled via fibre-optic cable. It sounds plausible, but it is an oversimplification – and it ignores the broader significance of electronic warfare.”
Stephan Kraschansky

More than jamming signals: what EW covers

For EW, jamming signals is far from the whole story: it also encompasses reconnaissance, analysis and defence. On the modern battlefield it forms the invisible layer, because every radio message, every radar signal and every data transmission leaves its own signature. Whoever dominates the electromagnetic spectrum can detect the adversary without being detected – or blind them at the decisive moment.

In drone warfare, this is exactly what matters. No drone can do without sensors. Even one guided by fibre-optic cable – for instance certain systems with a cable spool – must first be detected. Alongside the radio frequency (RF) sensor, a radar almost always does this job. Radars, however, also operate in the electromagnetic spectrum and can themselves be detected, jammed or deceived. Electromagnetic combat thus resembles a permanent game of cat and mouse.

Radio control keeps evolving

Most drones are still controlled by radio, and this technology is not standing still. Modern first-person view (FPV) systems have long ceased to rely solely on 2.4 or 5.8 GHz and now use frequencies up to 8 GHz. This makes monitoring and jamming more difficult, and electronic defence has to keep rising to new challenges. Without specialised sensors and flexible jamming systems, one would be defenceless against this development.

Fibre optics: a special case with clear limits

That fibre optics is displacing radio control is a myth. Such systems do exist, but they come with four clear disadvantages:

• Limited range: the cable significantly restricts operations; beyond 20 kilometres it becomes difficult.
• High vulnerability: terrain, obstacles or the adversary can cause cables to snag, be damaged or be severed.
• One-time use: after a mission, many cables can no longer be used or are simply left behind.
• Detectable: following the cable can reveal the operator's position; in addition, the terrain often limits the choice of suitable launch sites.

Fibre-optic drones therefore remain specialist tools for particular scenarios rather than a solution for widespread use.

Moreover, whether a drone is controlled via fibre optics cannot be determined at all without electromagnetic sensors. Only they show whether radio links are active in the airspace. Only then is it possible to distinguish whether a drone is radio-controlled, tethered to a cable or flying fully autonomously. Without this information, one is left in the dark – including on the question of whether one's own jamming systems can be effective at all.

Electronic counter-drone defence as a permanent base layer

Rather than an add-on, electronic counter-drone defence should be understood as a constant companion and an indispensable base layer. It detects control, navigation, telemetry and data transmissions, can trigger jamming, cut links and mislead the adversary through deception. Its effect is not merely reactive but also preventive: it is what creates the necessary situational picture in the first place.

Relying exclusively on kinetic means such as air defence missiles or projectile systems is risky. Such systems are expensive, can often be easily overwhelmed and can hardly be used in urban environments. Electronic defence, by contrast, is flexible, scalable and non-lethal – a decisive advantage especially in civilian scenarios, for example at airports, in football stadiums or during state visits.

Conclusion: without electronic defence, forces are left blind

Anyone who considers electronic counter-drone defence outdated misjudges how modern conflicts actually unfold. Unmanned systems have long ceased to be mere flying cameras; they are reconnaissance assets, attackers and saboteurs. Countering them requires a combination of measures – and within it, electronic warfare plays a key role.