Drone pilots from Ukraine inflict heavy losses on US armoured brigade in major exercise at Hohenfels

Three days, 70 per cent losses: Ukrainian drone specialists inflicted heavy simulated losses on an American armoured brigade during a military exercise in Germany. The US soldiers learned quickly, however, changed their tactics and finally launched a counter-attack with more than 700 drones of their own. NATO troops had experienced something similar shortly before during exercises in Sweden, Estonia and Portugal.

The scene was the Hohenfels training area in Bavaria in spring 2026. In “Combined Resolve 26-07”, the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division – known as “Greywolf” – faced a simulated opponent. This opponent was reinforced by specialists from the Ukrainian 412th Regiment of the Unmanned Systems Forces, who are best known by the name “Nemesis”. The exercise made clear how vulnerable even heavily armoured formations are to modern drones.

The Ukrainians applied their experience from the war against Russia directly in the exercise, and the American soldiers felt the consequences drastically. In the first three days, drones accounted for around 70 per cent of the simulated losses – either through direct attacks or because they reconnoitred targets that the artillery then engaged.

The opposing side made contact with drones more than 750 times over the course of the roughly ten-day exercise.

The figures were published in an article in the journal Military Review of the US Army. In it, brigade commander Colonel Michael Ziegelhofer and six other officers describe what they experienced and what lessons they drew from it.

Adapted combat command reduces losses

According to the report, however, what stands out is the speed with which the American brigade reacted. As early as the third day of the exercise, the share of losses caused by drones fell below 30 per cent, even though the opponent did not scale back its drone activity. The decisive factor was not so much new technology as a consistently adapted approach to combat command.

The brigade did have electronic counter-drone systems at its disposal. These jammed the control links and could thus create protection zones of up to two kilometres in diameter. However, they had to be operated while stationary and were relocated step by step during the advance – which opened up dangerous gaps precisely when on the move. Moreover, the jamming remained largely ineffective against fibre-optic-controlled drones.

For a large part of the brigade, classic military principles were therefore what mattered: camouflage and concealment, dispersed forces, smaller march routes and rapid changes of position. The authors estimate that around 60 per cent of successful counter-drone defence at brigade level is based on combat discipline, tactical procedures and soldierly craft.

The adaptations came at a price. To reduce their electronic signature, the crews switched off Blue Force Tracking, for example, used the radio less and sometimes even did without satellite links via Starshield.

Logistics also came under pressure: enemy drones specifically monitored and attacked the supply routes, so that resupplying the brigade took twice as long as originally planned.

Counter-attack with more than 700 drones

In the subsequent attack, it was now the US brigade's turn to rely on unmanned systems on a large scale. It was supported by the 3rd Battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which was serving as an experimental drone unit at the time. A total of more than 700 drones were in use at the various command levels from platoon to brigade.

With the help of relay drones, almost all of the battalion's aircraft achieved ranges of 25 to 40 kilometres. Practically the entire training area, measuring around 14 by 27 kilometres, could thus be covered.

At first, however, the sheer number of drones created new difficulties. The command structures were designed for far fewer sensors. In the operations centre, the flood of information led to overload, and airspace coordination could no longer keep up with so many drones flying at the same time. At times, the brigade staff did not even know exactly how many of its own drones were in the air.

Missions instead of micromanagement

The problem was solved by giving the drone units more autonomy. Instead of controlling each individual aircraft centrally, the units received clear missions and priorities. Within this framework, they were allowed to reconnoitre and engage targets independently.

Coordination with the artillery was also simplified. The brigade pushed a coordinated fire line forward; beyond it, drones and artillery were allowed to engage targets without further clearance. Enemy drone control stations had the highest priority. The brigade also kept part of its drone munitions in reserve for the decisive phase of the attack.

Manned and unmanned aircraft were separated from one another mainly by different flight altitudes. Attack helicopters and medical evacuation flights were given their own corridors. At the end of the exercise, the brigade broke through simultaneously at two points in densely wooded terrain, around six kilometres apart.

According to the US officers involved, the opponent was unable to identify where the main effort of the attack lay. Both breakthroughs were successful, and the enemy reserve had already been eliminated before it could be committed.

What the Ukrainian drone pilots are passing on to the US Army

US company commander Allan Watson also described, in an article for Task & Purpose, the impression the Ukrainian drone specialists had left on him.

According to Watson, when his company drove through the only gate onto the training area, drones of the Ukrainian unit were already in the air above the American vehicles. The Ukrainians, he said, impressively demonstrated how low-cost drones can be used at exceptionally long distances. What impressed Watson most was how quickly the specialists linked reconnaissance and effects. These experiences are now to feed directly into the further development of the American armoured brigades.

Among other things, the authors of the Military Review article propose grouping drones in future in multi-functional strike units. These are to be equipped with means for long-range reconnaissance out to at least 40 kilometres, with medium and heavy bomber drones and with attack drones supported via relays. In addition, each battalion is to receive its own smaller drone strike platoons.

The officers also place great emphasis on digital networking. In future, all of a brigade's drones are to feed into a common operational picture. In this context, they explicitly refer to the Ukrainian battle management system Delta as a model.

They also see a considerable need to catch up in counter-drone defence. Systems are required that work not only when stationary but also on the move – ranging from active defence systems on individual vehicles to solutions with radar and effectors at brigade level.

Gotland, Estonia, Portugal: the same picture at other NATO exercises

Hohenfels is not an isolated case. At several other NATO exercises, Ukrainian drone specialists have already shown Western armed forces how vulnerable they are.

During a large exercise on the Swedish Baltic island of Gotland, for example, Ukrainian drone pilots caused the Swedish units so much trouble that the training had to be interrupted several times. At times the Ukrainians took on the role of the attacker there and brought their experience from the real war directly to bear.

The result of the “Hedgehog 2025” exercise in Estonia was even clearer. Around 16,000 NATO soldiers from twelve countries faced Ukrainian drone teams there. In one scenario, a ten-strong Ukrainian team is said to have achieved 17 simulated destructions of armoured vehicles and 30 further attacks within half a day. Two NATO battalions were thus put out of action on a single exercise day.

A similar picture emerged at sea. Off Portugal, at “REPMUS/Dynamic Messenger 2025”, a multinational team under Ukrainian leadership, which also included Americans, Britons and Spaniards, won all five exercise scenarios. Among other things, attacks on ports and convoys and their defence were simulated. A ship counted as hit as soon as a drone had been the first to target it and had documented this. In one of the scenarios, the Ukrainian-led team even marked a NATO frigate as hit several times.

All these exercises lead to the same conclusion: even technologically advanced Western armed forces are vulnerable to modern drone operations. Hohenfels also shows, however, that adapted tactics, consistent combat discipline and the coordinated use of one's own drones noticeably reduce this vulnerability. What is decisive is how quickly armed forces learn from this and adjust their conduct of operations to the new reality.