Long-range drones of Ukraine: the weapons Kyiv uses to hit targets 1,000 kilometres and more inside Russia

Since mid-2025, Ukraine has significantly stepped up its attacks with very long-range unguided aircraft – long-range drones whose missions, according to open sources, are quite successful. In addition to the confirmed hits, there are likely to be further effects that cannot be independently verified as long as nobody is on site.

Targets in the “deep sky”

With the emergence of long-range attack drones, range is becoming increasingly important. Increasing it is the task of technicians and engineers. Soldiers who select targets and draw up flight plans, by contrast, must above all identify and circumvent the enemy air defence system – a decisive part of the planning.

Important Russian defence plants lie between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometres beyond Ukrainian territory, and the Ukrainian Army is increasingly focusing on them. Russian air defence calls the close range “the small sky” and, consequently, the long distances “the deep sky”.

There, in the deep sky, lies Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil, where tanks, railway wagons and other machinery are built. Within the same distance are Uraltransmash in Yekaterinburg, which produces guns and self-propelled artillery, the tractor plant in Chelyabinsk, a powder factory in Perm, an aircraft plant in Kazan and the Alabuga special economic zone, where the Geran-2 attack drone is mainly produced.

This radius also contains more than half of the Russian Federation's crude oil processing capacity.

The A-22 as pioneer

The first success came on the morning of 2 April 2024, when an Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat attacked the Alabuga special economic zone. The light aircraft, converted into an unmanned drone, struck one of the workers' residential buildings, in the first of what are now at least four completed worker camps. Judging by current satellite images, it has not been repaired to this day.

On 6 November 2024, an A-22 reached a Russian Navy base in the port of Dagestan on the Caspian Sea at a distance of around 1,200 kilometres. In December 2024, the same drone type then hit the OMON barracks in Grozny, which is around 1,100 kilometres from Ukraine.

2025: more types, more hits

Ukraine's arsenal of long-range kamikaze drones grew considerably last year. With the E-300 Enterprise, based on the Skyranger Ninja light aircraft, Ukraine has an unmanned aerial vehicle that carries 300 kilograms of payload for fuel and weapons. In practice, it can fly up to 1,700 kilometres. According to Russian sources, the most massive attack so far took place on 23 April 2025, again against the Alabuga drone factories. However, nothing is said to have been effectively hit.

There is, however, also an indirect effect: because Russia has only limited air defence assets, it must now increasingly use them to protect important facilities in the “deep sky”. There, equipment and personnel may remain unused for weeks or months and are missing elsewhere.

A variant of the AN-196 Liutyi is also available for long ranges. Without landing gear, this drone is lighter and has less drag – enough to achieve the range needed for the 1,000+ kilometre category.

On 5 May 2025, Nadym airport in Yamal suspended operations “to ensure flight safety”. Russia calls the closure of airspace due to drone flights the “Carpet plan”; such a measure 2,200 kilometres east of Moscow has so far been an isolated case. A reconnaissance flight may have taken place, dispensing with a warhead and carrying more fuel instead.

The “Kupol” plant in Izhevsk, more than 1,300 kilometres from Ukrainian territory, was hit by two Liutyi on 7 July 2025. Kupol is involved in producing missiles for air defence. Two workshops where metal was machined and microchips soldered were destroyed.

Fire Point and the FP-1

In terms of numbers, the FP-1 long-range drone launched by the company Fire Point carries weight. According to Ukrainian sources, 100 units can be produced per day. With a 120-kilogram warhead, the drone flies up to 1,600 kilometres.

Whether the reported production figure comes close to reality is unknown. What is certain: since Liutyi and FP-1 became available, the number of attacks on distant Russian infrastructure has been increasing. In September last year, for example, FP-1 drones hit a pumping station and a tanker near the Transneft-Port oil terminal on the Baltic Sea north of St Petersburg.

One of Ukraine’s leading defense companies, Fire Point, which is behind the Flamingo cruise missile, is also mass-producing the FP-1 drone with a flight range of over 1,000 km.
Photos taken at an undisclosed location in Ukraine on August 18 appeared tonight.
📷: AP/Efrem… pic.twitter.com/N40oRdeDr6— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) August 21, 2025

Even oil production platforms in the Caspian Sea are no longer safe. Successful attacks have hit, among others, a logistics centre in Tatarstan, a military barracks in Chechnya, chemical companies and gas and oil infrastructure facilities.

On 24 September 2025, it became clear that Ukraine can combine its unmanned systems forces for complex operations even over long distances. On that day, unmanned systems from the air and from the sea jointly attacked the Russian naval port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, around 450 kilometres as the crow flies from Ukrainian territory. Systems that had flown for at least several hours or sailed across the sea for one to two days arrived there simultaneously.

A video of the strikes on Russian Lukoil drilling platforms in the Caspian Sea. https://t.co/J3pIM47Tfi pic.twitter.com/soATRCRXvN— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) January 11, 2026

How long-range drones penetrate air defences

The line across which Ukrainian drones can enter Russian airspace measures around 2,100 kilometres – from the Russian-Belarusian border in the north to Sochi on the Black Sea in the south-east. Given the ranges achieved, more than three million square kilometres, well over three quarters of European Russia, are likely to be within reach of Ukrainian long-range drones.

A diverse repertoire is available to overcome Russian air defences. One element: acting unpredictably and irregularly. The Ukrainians therefore change the attack axes daily along which the drones cover the most difficult part of the flight. The highest losses are said to occur at the first line of defence. Yet it is precisely there that the long-range drones can also be bundled into swarms with shorter-range systems. The targets also change from day to day.

The 1st Separate Centre for Unmanned Systems of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces is considered mainly responsible for planning and executing most attacks on the Russian hinterland. Little is known about the unit, formerly designated the 14th Regiment; neither the name nor a photo of its commander “Charlie” exists. For Russian intelligence it is a priority target. The drones take off from new locations every day, all in strict secrecy.

The unit does not select its targets by opportunity or at will; it acts strategically. In August 2025, for example, Ukraine intensified attacks on Russian refineries. In September the target priority then changed surprisingly: within a few days, several strategic arsenals of the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate were attacked. From these main ammunition depots, munitions are distributed to Russian units.

Area-wide protection becomes necessary

Russia must therefore deploy its air defence systems both along a very long border and in depth. Over the past two years, the number of sites that would actually need protection has risen steadily. In Alabuga, for example, several ramps and platforms were built for Pantsir-S1 and Tor-M2 air defence systems. Videos show that these are operational positions and not merely decoys.

Near Alabuga, Ukrainian A-22 Foxbat drones took evasive action after the air defence systems had been activated. Russian military bloggers conclude that electronic receivers in the X/Ka band trigger these manoeuvres in the flight control.

Another interesting point concerns Russian infrastructure: mobile internet is being switched off more and more often. In addition, there is the so-called “SIM card cooling-off”, in force since 10 November. If SIM cards enter Russia from abroad or have been inactive for more than 72 hours, they are denied access to mobile internet and cannot send text messages – until it is confirmed that the card is not in an unmanned device. This has considerable negative consequences for business and tourism.

The latest long-distance attacks

Between 2 and 7 January, the attacks successfully hit these targets:

• Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery in Samara
• Almetyevsk oil refinery in Tatarstan
• Afipsky oil refinery in Krasnodar
• Ryazan oil refinery in Ryazan
• Yaroslavl oil refinery in Yaroslavl
• “Wypilzovo” oil refinery in Belgorod
• “Dorogobuzh” chemical plant in Smolensk and “Kirovo-Chepetsky” chemical plant in Kirov – both part of the explosives industry – as well as logistics centres
• Russian Army fuel and lubricant depots and logistics centres NP Chliborne and NP Sofiivka in Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Donetsk.

The attacks are planned centrally by the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Ukrainian Army.