ITAR as an underestimated risk: how US export rules help decide the fate of Europe's drone programmes

Europe spends 739 billion euros every year on building strategic autonomy. Yet many key components of modern European drone systems are still subject to American export regulations such as ITAR. In an emergency, this creates an operational bottleneck: without approval from Washington, Europe cannot freely use, modify or pass on its own systems to partners. A guest commentary by Laurynas Šatas.

On 21 May, the British defence secretary's aircraft ran into massive GPS interference over NATO's eastern flank, and the pilots had to switch entirely to inertial navigation. Shortly after take-off in Estonia, the satellite signal had been degraded by presumably Russian jamming, and navigation disruptions rose to twenty times the normal level. This exposed a vulnerability that armed forces in Europe have been warning about for years.

Many armies in Europe are responding by relying more heavily on optical laser targeting systems, which also work when GPS fails. In almost all European drone programmes, however, it is precisely these systems that are subject to US export regulations.

Record spending and the SAFE mandate

“Europe is currently increasing its defence spending more sharply than at any time since the 1950s.”

Europe has not seen such a sharp rise in defence spending as it is seeing today since the 1950s. In 2025 alone, 739 billion euros were invested, 14 per cent more than the year before. A considerable share of the money goes into autonomous systems, supported by initiatives such as the European Drone Defence Initiative or Eastern Flank Watch.

To ensure that these investments genuinely strengthen European capabilities, the European Union has introduced the SAFE mandate. It requires at least 65 per cent of the components in an EU-funded defence project to come from Europe.

How ITAR reaches into European drone systems

Buying European products avoids foreign dependencies – or so many procurement organisations assume. In practice, however, ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), the American set of rules, often still applies. If a drone system developed in Europe contains even a single chip or sensor from the USA, the entire system is legally subject to US export control. Europe pays for the platform, but in case of doubt the US State Department decides on its use.

The figures also show how far this problem extends. According to the European Parliament, up to 60 per cent of the drone components assembled in Europe currently come from third countries, primarily the USA and China. This conflicts with the SAFE mandate: because there is as yet no sovereign European industry for many key components, procurement authorities are setting requirements that can hardly be met at present.

“According to the European Parliament, up to 60 per cent of the drone components assembled in Europe currently come from third countries, above all the USA and China.”

This risk is by no means purely theoretical, as became clear back in 2023. At the time, Space X restricted the use of Starlink for Ukrainian drone operations over Crimea. The deciding factor was neither political decisions nor international treaties, but the possible consequences of US export regulations.

Many drone programmes of European NATO states today contain exactly this legal logic. The United States is a reliable ally, but reliability does not automatically mean predictability. Europe should not need permission from Washington to use its own defence systems. European procurement has so far not dealt adequately with this legal dependency, which is a structural problem.

Funding criterion: free from US export control

Funding programmes in Europe are now responding. Both ReArm Europe and the European Defence Industry Programme now explicitly list ITAR-free status as a funding criterion. This is not meant as a turn away from transatlantic partners, but as a sober assessment of operational risks.

An analysis by the Kiel Institute concludes that, with around 500 billion euros, Europe could build up a largely independent military capability over the next ten years – on condition that the underlying systems are not subject to external export controls.

This rethinking starts as early as the development stage. As an engineer, I have experienced first-hand that marketing does not produce a truly ITAR-free system – only an architecture rethought from the ground up can do that. Whether lens, sensor or circuit board: every part has to be deliberately developed or sourced in Europe.

For some particularly critical components, exactly that was simply impossible until recently. These included above all lightweight laser targeting systems, which allow tactical drones to be used precisely even in poor visibility or when GPS has failed.

A European supplier able to deliver such laser targeting systems on an industrial scale without ITAR restrictions has only existed since June 2026. Before that, the very component that largely determines a drone's precision was inevitably subject to US export regulations.

“If Europe invests hundreds of billions of euros in its defence, the systems procured must also belong fully to the states that rely on them in an emergency.”

Whether a system was assembled in Europe is therefore not the decisive question. What matters instead is whether every mission-critical component is free from US export control before the contract is signed. My company has deliberately developed its systems to be ITAR-free – not for marketing reasons, but because military users made it clear that they could not wait for approvals from Washington in a crisis.

If Europe invests hundreds of billions of euros in its defence, the systems procured must also belong entirely to the states that rely on them in an emergency.