Azov Brigade: drones in frontline combat – Mykyta Puz on unmanned systems in the air and on land

The 12th Special Forces Brigade “Azov” is part of the National Guard of Ukraine. Mykyta Puz, responsible for military technology, talks about the use of unmanned systems in the air and on land. And he gives an insight into why Western “wonder weapons” often fail at the front.

Mr Puz, the Azov Brigade does not look back on a long history, but it has been an eventful one. How did the unit come into being?
Azov began in 2014 as a group of volunteers who were directly confronted with Russian aggression and wanted to defend the country without waiting for formal military procedures. However, it was quickly professionalised in the same year and integrated into the National Guard of Ukraine, making it an integral part of the Ukrainian army. We have developed from an original battalion into a fully fledged brigade, which has since been converted into a corps structure – the brigade now comprises around 5,000 soldiers. We are part of the 1st Corps of the National Guard, which unites a total of six brigades under its command: Azov, Burevii, Chervona Kalyna, Liubart, Kara-Dag and Harmash. Since the reform of the chain of command a little more than a year ago, when the Ukrainian armed forces introduced the corps structure, we have been operating as a corps.

How is the brigade organised in detail?
The brigade consists of a complex structure of units. We have three infantry battalions, an assault battalion, a special battalion for unmanned systems, a tank battalion and our own artillery group. In addition, we have numerous smaller support units, for example for reconnaissance and air defence. Although we are a special operations brigade, we nevertheless have a fixed, direct area of responsibility at the front. We are currently stationed in a specific area in the Dobropillia region in Donetsk oblast. Our main task is to repel the enemy in our assigned sector of the front through the coordinated use of all these forces.

Historically, the brigade is closely linked to the defence of Mariupol. How did that period shape the unit into what it is today?
Until 2022, the city was the central base for our units. When the full-scale invasion began, all personnel withdrew to Mariupol to defend the city, where we eventually regrouped at the Azovstal steelworks. There we resisted until we received a direct order from the President of Ukraine to surrender – with the assurance that it would be an honourable captivity. The reality turned out to be a blatant lie. It became a kind of gulag for our fighters. Many of our soldiers are returning from this captivity only very slowly and in small groups. At present, around 700 Azov fighters are still in Russian captivity, held there since 2022. When the commanders were released, they began rebuilding the unit. Thus Azov was revived in 2023 and returned to active combat.

What role do drones play in your brigade?
Unmanned systems are the absolute backbone of our combat operations. In numbers: in 2025, 92 percent of enemy targets in our area of responsibility were neutralised by unmanned systems. The rest was accounted for by artillery and small arms. Because this is such a decisive factor, we are investing massively in expanding these capabilities. We have a dedicated battalion for unmanned systems, but unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are integrated throughout the entire brigade. Every infantry battalion has a drone company that deploys strike and reconnaissance drones at the tactical level. Even the artillery group can no longer operate without drone support today. We work with a multi-layered structure: at battalion level we act on the tactical and tactical-operational level, the UAV battalion operates on the operational to strategic level, and the corps has its own unit for operational-strategic tasks.

“Unmanned systems are the absolute backbone of our combat operations.”

Which specific types are deployed? 
Of course there is no “wonder weapon”, no “one drone” that solves all problems. Everything depends on the respective tactics and the respective mission. We are constantly experimenting with new developments. Among strike drones, first-person-view (FPV) systems with 10- to 13-inch propellers are the most important category. A highly effective segment is fibre-optic-guided FPV drones, which are resistant to conventional jamming measures. These were a game changer in 2024 and 2025. At present, however, we are struggling with a global shortage of fibre-optic cable, caused by large-scale buyers such as the Meta group for data centres. The price of a spool of fibre-optic cable has increased fivefold: from five to seven euros to 35 euros per kilometre. That makes these drones economically questionable, which is why we are switching to cheaper alternatives. We also deploy fixed-wing strike drones for ranges of 30 to 60 kilometres and heavy multicopters with payloads of up to 20 kilograms for targeted attacks. For reconnaissance, we use tactical civilian products such as those from DJI and Autel, while for operational purposes we deploy specialised intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) fixed-wing drones with ranges of up to 50 kilometres.

How do you deal with the constant arms race in electronic warfare?
It is an ongoing process: measure, countermeasure, counter-countermeasure. Modern FPV drones allow frequency changes during flight. Experienced operators recognise jamming signals and adapt the link immediately. We also use radio relays and various undisclosed methods to ensure that we can continue to operate. The innovation cycle for military technology in Ukraine is only four months for us, and by that I mean from concept to deployment at the front. Equipment delivered “off the shelf” is often already outdated on arrival, because the enemy adapts its electronic warfare (EW) systems rapidly. That is why each of our UAV units runs its own laboratories, where technicians modify hardware, solder components and adjust frequencies. This maintenance work often takes place directly in the combat zone, only a few kilometres from the front line.

What do the counter-UAV measures in your brigade look like in concrete terms?
At battalion level we have specialised EW teams. They deploy not only jammers but a complex system of signals intelligence, radar data and electronic reconnaissance. At brigade and corps level we have air defence units that engage enemy reconnaissance drones and strike systems such as the Russian Lancet or Shahed.

“The innovation cycle for military technology in Ukraine is only four months for us, and by that I mean from concept to deployment at the front.”

Do “soft-kill” or “hard-kill” methods dominate in counter-drone defence?
At the tactical level, “soft kill” dominates – that is, electronic jamming. A blanket “hard-kill” network against the enormous density of FPV drones – there are hundreds every day on both sides per sector of the front – is neither economically nor technically feasible. As a last line of defence, our infantrymen use 12-gauge shotguns in an emergency. This is a measure of last resort, but one that requires additional training. At the operational level, however, for example against higher-flying ISR drones, “hard kill” is indispensable. Here we deploy interceptor drones. The biggest challenge is target acquisition: the interceptor drone has to locate the target in the airspace, often only on the basis of vague radar data. There is a massive need for automation here, because the time between launch and target acquisition is often too short.

How effective are these interceptor drones and at what level are they deployed? 
They are quite effective and currently the most frequently used weapon of the air defence formations in Ukraine, apart from systems such as Patriot or Iris-T, which are intended for high-value targets such as ballistic missiles. Against fixed-wing strike drones, our interceptor drones achieve an efficiency of 40 to 80 percent depending on the model. The biggest challenge here is navigation during flight. The anti-UAV units receive information from radars or from signals intelligence, but often know only the approximate position and altitude. The operator's task is then to launch the interceptor drone as quickly as possible and locate the target in the sky before the interceptor drone runs out of range. This search is time-consuming and often leads to unsuccessful launches, because the interceptor drone's battery is empty before the target can be located.

Looking ahead to the coming months: which technical innovations will be decisive in the near future?
The focus must be on target acquisition. We need interceptor drones that launch largely autonomously on the basis of data from the ground station and navigate to the target area. Terminal guidance for aerial targets must also become more efficient. Innovation should not be pursued for its own sake, but to solve concrete problems. This applies in particular to the communications architecture: mesh systems, satellite links and frequency-agile links are more decisive than the aircraft itself. In addition, we must be able to pull personnel, first and foremost the drone pilots, further back out of the immediate danger zone while at the same time maintaining control over greater distances.

How are you currently deploying unmanned ground vehicles?
For us, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are first and foremost a logistics tool: around 90 percent of our UGV missions serve to supply frontline positions. Because manned vehicles cannot approach the front line closer than 15 to 20 kilometres due to the immediate threat from drones, our infantry has to cover these distances on foot. To relieve and protect the soldiers, we deploy UGVs to transport ammunition, rations and equipment to the positions, for example. Another critical issue is medical evacuation: we use the return trips of the supply UGVs to bring back the wounded, because manual transport over the 20-kilometre route is an extreme strain for them. While we are actively developing capabilities for strike UGVs, due to the tactical situation the focus is currently almost exclusively on this life-saving support.

“The Western defence industry tends to develop complex, expensive individual systems that fail too quickly in combat. We prefer ten cheaper UGVs to a single high-tech robot.”

Where, in your opinion, are the biggest misconceptions in the West regarding warfare with unmanned systems?
The main problem is cost-effectiveness. A high-end ISR drone that costs 50,000 euros and is destroyed by a 500-euro interceptor drone is not sustainable in a war of attrition. The same applies to UGVs. A 5,000-euro model and a 60,000-euro model both burn in the same way when they are hit. The Western defence industry tends to develop complex, expensive individual systems that fail too quickly in combat. We prefer ten cheaper UGVs to a single high-tech robot. Another misconception is the AI hype: we do not need general-purpose AI weapons, but specific solutions for concrete problems such as improved terminal guidance. We have been fighting for four years, and so far no “wonder weapon” has survived the reality of the war of attrition. One has to think in terms of systems that can withstand the enemy's countermeasures both economically and tactically.