Unmanned systems in the Ukraine war: Graz panel exposes Europe’s lag in speed

How profoundly the Ukraine war has upended the development of unmanned systems and drones was shown by a panel discussion at “Beyond Mobility” in Graz. Three findings ran through the evening: systems are getting smaller, development cycles shorter, and soldiers work directly with developers. In terms of speed, Europe’s armed forces accordingly have considerable catching up to do; unmanned systems on the Ukrainian model demand different processes.

The 19th edition of the Graz Systems & Vision Forum (GSVF) took place on 7 and 8 October in Graz under the title “Beyond Mobility – Smart, Sustainable & Secure Ecosystems”. Virtual Vehicle, the organiser, supplemented the traditional focus on mobility with applications from defence and health tech; the second day was devoted exclusively to military matters.

On the panel were Brigadier General Jürgen Schlechter, Commander of the Armaments and Defence Technology Agency (Amt für Rüstung und Wehrtechnik, ARWT) of the Austrian Armed Forces (Bundesheer), Captain Volodymyr Mirchuk of the 21st Unmanned Systems Regiment of the 2nd Corps “Khartiia” of the Ukrainian National Guard, Professor Florian Holzapfel of the Technical University of Munich, and Thomas Wambera, Vice President Defense at Apex.

The guiding question of the round was by what route technological developments can become genuinely operational military systems more quickly.

Unmanned systems at the front: 30,000 robotic missions a month

Mirchuk pinned the pace of change to figures: Ukraine counted around 25,000 missions with unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) in August; in September the figure was already about 30,000.

A wide range of wheeled and tracked vehicles is used. What matters, however, is not technical complexity but whether a system is operational in practice.

Mirchuk argued for small, cheap and easily repairable systems; he considers UGV with a payload of around 300 to 500 kilograms particularly practical. Large, heavy vehicles are expensive to procure and maintain – and on the ever more transparent battlefield they stand out as targets.

Sections of the front that are monitored and engaged by drones can extend over several dozen kilometres. What counts there above all is getting materiel to its destination inconspicuously and at acceptable risk.

Ukrainian marines have confirmed this experience, Mirchuk said: for many logistics tasks, comparatively simple civilian transport vehicles proved particularly useful. The biggest or most capable vehicle is therefore not automatically the best solution.

Development cycles of four months

When it comes to development times, the gap between Ukraine and Western procurement structures stands out even more sharply. According to Mirchuk, an innovation cycle for new systems and adaptations takes around four months on average; more complex projects need six months, while individual solutions such as first-person-view (FPV) drones or interceptor drones are sometimes adapted within two months.

The basis for this is the direct line between developers, technicians and soldiers in the field. Mirchuk’s unit alone has at least five workshops and development labs; ten to 20 per cent of its personnel take on technical tasks there, from programming and design to repairing and further developing existing systems.

The process resembles a loop: develop, trial on training grounds, test under operational conditions, improve immediately on the basis of feedback – and start again. In-house software for fleet management, mission analysis and logistics rounds this off. Among other things, it lets commanders see which UGV are currently deployed, which have been damaged or destroyed, and what lessons individual missions provide. Collected video and sensor data are later meant to advance AI-supported functions.

Mirchuk addressed a clear recommendation to Western armed forces: before immediately procuring large UGV fleets, build up in-house capacities for training, development and modernisation. Armed forces must be able to operate, maintain and rapidly adapt systems to new requirements themselves.

Bundesheer caught between the law and a backlog

Brigadier General Jürgen Schlechter pointed to the differing framework conditions: Ukraine is acting under the immediate pressure of war, whereas the Austrian Bundesheer is bound by legal requirements and regular procurement procedures.

He nevertheless sees a considerable need for action. For decades, Austria invested too little in its armed forces, and this backlog cannot be fully made up within a few years. Priority therefore goes first to restoring existing capabilities and modernising conventional weapon systems. Unmanned systems are nonetheless already part of the Bundesheer’s development and will continue to gain weight in future.

Schlechter does not expect an immediate focus on larger procurements of unmanned ground vehicles in the next five years. Things could move faster, however, for remotely controlled solutions and selected specialised applications.

At the same time he called for established ways of thinking to be critically reviewed. His example: the debate on training drone pilots, in which requirements are sometimes carried over from manned aviation – from his personal point of view not always sensible. Procuring new technologies is not enough; the organisational and technical prerequisites for continually adapting them are also needed. Partners from industry and research could support the Bundesheer in this.

Industry: simple design, scalable production

Thomas Wambera of Apex brought in the industry perspective. Reconciling performance, cost and industrial scalability, he said, is the key difficulty in developing unmanned ground vehicles. His recipe: keep designs simple, use existing components and lay out vehicles from the outset so that they are not only built as prototypes but can be produced quickly in larger numbers when needed.

Apex worked closely with Ukrainian partners and suppliers in the process, some of whom had never dealt with military vehicles before. Short lines of coordination and constant feedback from the field were decisive, he said.

Wambera explicitly warned against the tendency towards technical over-engineering that is widespread in Germany and Europe: additional requirements make systems more expensive and prolong development without increasing practical benefit to the same degree. Modular architectures are therefore the key – if hardware and software evolve largely independently of each other, new capabilities can be integrated faster and existing platforms modernised more easily.

Research calls for tolerance of failure

Professor Florian Holzapfel of the Technical University of Munich also argued for a fundamental overhaul of development processes. Using a research project on unmanned casualty evacuation, he described how much depends on direct exchange between developers and future users. The technical components are at different stages: transport platforms are considered comparatively mature, while automated medical functions are still in earlier phases of development.

He described excessive or impractical requirements as a particular obstacle. At one point, for example, a payload of at least 500 kilograms was demanded for a drone to transport one casualty – hardly comprehensible for the actual task.

Instead of extensive requirement catalogues and years of specification, developers and users should experiment together and learn from the results. That presupposes more tolerance of failure: an attempt that fails early yields valuable insights and ultimately saves time and money, as long as no people are put at risk.

No less important is interoperability. Different platforms, sensors and communication systems must be able to connect even if they were never originally intended for joint use.

Logistics before evacuation

At the end stood the question of which tasks unmanned ground vehicles should take on first. Mirchuk was unequivocal: logistics has priority, because without functioning supply no military operation is possible.