Lancet drone: how an inconspicuous Russian system became a problem for Ukraine

Propaganda inflating the performance of Russian weapon systems is almost legendary – and in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine these claims have so far not been borne out. Yet one rather inconspicuous system has become both a worry and a terror for Ukraine: the Lancet drone.

Since the last quarter of 2022, Russia has recorded significantly more combat successes with the drone system. These are not merely claimed hits: the statistics are based on analysis of numerous videos appearing in growing numbers on Russian social media about the war. Reason enough to take a closer look at the Lancet drone.

Lancet drone – the “Kalashnikov of the skies”

Lancet is made by the Russian company ZALA Aero, a subsidiary of the well-known Kalashnikov group. The weapon system was first presented publicly at the “Army” fair in 2019; from 2020, individual units were tested in the Syrian conflict. Lancet appeared in Ukraine from summer 2022. Initially, the Russian side published videos of three to six hits per month on average. From October 2022 this figure shot up to 20 to 40 hits a month, and in May 61 hits marked a new peak. This strongly suggests that the Russian army has recognised the system’s effectiveness and that industry is producing more.

According to the available figures, at most a handful of Lancet teams are in action on the Russian side so far. These specialists are nevertheless very painful for the Ukrainians, as the teams select their targets carefully and almost exclusively hit high-value Ukrainian systems that are not easily replaced.

Civilian components inside

The Lancet unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has little to do with high tech. The electronics inside the drone consist of imported civilian parts, which Russia still obtains through grey imports despite sanctions. Installed components include the “Nvidia Jetson TX2” single-board computer, other electronic components from the USA and South Korea, a battery from China and a civilian multi-frequency satellite navigation receiver from u-blox, a Swiss company.

In this way the engineers have managed to create a very effective semi-autonomous system. Both the Lancet UAV and the ZALA-421 reconnaissance drone it works with as a system evidently have an electro-optical target tracking system. The operator marks an object or a satellite coordinate on the monitor; the electro-optical system, mounted on a stabilised, movable head, then tracks this object – whether stationary or moving.

Semi-autonomous, supported by the operator

In action, Lancet flies autonomously at a set altitude and heading. Meanwhile, the operator searches for the target with the zoomable, swivelling electro-optics in an area previously located by the ZALA-421 reconnaissance drone. Once the target is spotted, the operator resets the marking as often as needed and – depending on the target – triggers an automatic dive of roughly 20 to 40 degrees. The electro-optics zoom back from telephoto to wide angle, so Lancet seems barely to move. Only when the lens reaches its limit does the target grow rapidly and dramatically in the image, and the drone’s actual speed becomes noticeable.

The videos show that target tracking becomes increasingly difficult for Lancet as the UAV closes in on its final approach at around 200 km/h. The on-board computer at least partly fails to cope with the rapid, sharp changes in shape, size and angle of the tracked object in the video image. But because a “man-in-the-loop” is provided for, the UAV pilot can manually “correct” the target marking even during the final approach, until the radio link breaks off, helping Lancet to an optimal hit.

Defence and countermeasures

Because so many drones are being used in Ukraine, both sides are currently trying to deny the enemy use of the radio and radio-electronic domain with electronic countermeasures. At the same time, both employ electronic support measures – such as signal amplifiers – to keep their own assets operational in this environment. The fact is: drone operations are increasing on both sides of the front, and neither side’s electronic countermeasures seem capable of stopping this trend.

How effective weapon systems and countermeasures are, in absolute and relative terms, cannot be said because the data is unreliable. There are videos of hits, videos of successful interceptions and images of the drones’ internals – but no total number of systems deployed. Drone operators say the success rate is 30 per cent, possibly up to 50 per cent with good pilots. At first glance that seems unattractive. But the very small “footprint” in personnel, equipment and cost of drone warfare must be factored in – compared with the very high outlay in money, logistics and personnel that major weapon systems such as tanks or heavy artillery require. It then quickly becomes clear that even a drone success ratio of 1:5 or just 1:10 is extremely effective.

Hopes pinned on “technicals”

To better engage slow, low-flying air targets, Ukraine is currently procuring so-called “technicals”: off-road pickups with heavy machine guns, light-calibre automatic cannons or, in some cases, rocket launchers mounted on the cargo bed.

In the Europe of 2023, an MR-21 Viktor light truck with two 14.5-millimetre heavy machine guns on a manually operated mount may seem anachronistic. Against the low, slow-flying Lancet and Shahed, however, such vehicles are likely to be the means of choice for thickening Ukraine’s drone defence.